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Japan: Special Funds-Supplying Operations1 
 
Alec Buchholtz2 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 




Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the global commercial paper 
(CP) market began to tighten as interest rates rose and investors sought more-liquid money 
market securities. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) introduced several measures in late 2008 to make 
liquidity available to nonfinancial corporations that were strapped for cash. In December 
2008, the BOJ implemented special funds-supplying operations in order to provide unlimited 
liquidity to banks and other financial institutions so they could continue to fund nonfinancial 
corporations. The BOJ would provide one- to three-month loans against an equal value of 
eligible corporate debt at a rate equal to the target uncollateralized overnight call rate, which 
was consistently 0.1% throughout the operation’s lifetime. The short-term credit market 
gradually improved over the next year amidst consistent usage of the special operations. 
Approximately ¥38 trillion in loans were provided before the special operations ceased in 
March 2010. The special operations are viewed as relatively successful, as they contributed 
to shrinking CP spreads during the first few months of implementation and promoted new 
issuances of CP and other corporate debt. 




1 This case study is part of Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 








At a Glance  
In 2008, Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy disrupted 
short-term funding for nonfinancial companies, 
particularly through the commercial paper (CP) 
market. As CP markets tightened and investors 
turned to safer assets, investor demand for CP fell 
and interest rates on money market securities 
rose. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) introduced three 
facilities to promote liquidity in the commercial 
paper market. First, the BOJ enhanced its repo 
operations to cover a wider range of eligible 
collateral, including CP. The BOJ then introduced 
two new operations in December 2008: (1) 
special funds-supplying operations (the special 
operations), meant to facilitate short-term 
corporate financing, and (2) a measure to 
conduct outright purchases of CP, in which the 
BOJ would purchase three-month CP and asset-
backed CP (ABCP), aimed at shifting credit risk 
from financial institutions to the BOJ. 
The special operations became active on January 8, 2009, with an initial expiration date of March 31, 
2009. Under the special operations, the BOJ could auction loans to financial institutions, providing an 
unlimited amount of liquidity. Loan amounts were equal to the value of corporate debt instruments 
by participating counterparties. Under the terms and conditions, collateral that the BOJ deemed 
eligible included corporate debt, CP, and other bills or deeds for companies, with a residual maturity 
of between one month and three months. When loan payments were due at maturity, counterparties 
had to repay the principal loan amount, in addition to a fee equal to the average of the target 
uncollateralized overnight call rate, determined monthly by the BOJ Monetary Policy Board.  
The BOJ extended the measure three times: once until September 30, again until December 31, and 
lastly until March 31, 2010. The special operations were also amended to provide loans only up to 
three months and to not include ABCP as eligible collateral. Throughout 2009 and into early 2010, 
the BOJ loaned an aggregate amount of approximately ¥38 trillion to counterparties against eligible 
collateral under the special operations.  
Summary Evaluation 
One BOJ analysis found that the special operations, partly in conjunction with the measure to 
purchase CP outright, greatly contributed to a decrease in interest rate spreads on CP in Japanese 
markets during the first four months of 2009. The BOJ paper also observed that issuance rates of CP 
increased during this time, suggesting that the CP market improved thanks to the effects of the special 
operations.    
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: The operations aimed to ensure financial 
stability in Japanese financial markets and facilitate 
corporate financing through expanded money 
market operations. 
Introduction Date   November 21, 2008 
Operational Date January 8, 2009 
Termination Date  March 31, 2010 
Legal Authority Article 33/37/38, Bank of 
Japan Act 1997 
Size of the Fund Unlimited 
Aggregate Loans ~¥38 trillion (~370 billion) 
Covered Maturities Residual maturity between 1 
month and 3 months 
Loan Rate Avg. of target 
uncollateralized overnight 
call rate; fixed rate of  0.1% 
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Special Funds-Supplying Operations:  Japan Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted 
to USD) 
 
$4,680.1 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted 
to USD) 
 
$35,275 in 2007 




Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior 
debt)  














Size of banking system  
$6,980.8 in total assets in 2007         




Size of banking system as a percentage 
of GDP  
149.2% in 2007 




Size of banking system as a percentage 
of financial system  
Banking system assets equal to 50.2% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 52.1% of 
financial system in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system  
50.2% of total banking assets in 2007 
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Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
1% of total banking assets in 2007 
1% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Government ownership of banking 
system  
Data not available for 2007/2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Data not available for 2007/2008 










Early in the 2007-09 financial crisis, Japan’s economy was relatively stable, withstanding 
spillover effects from the housing crisis in the United States and the deteriorating conditions 
in Europe. However, after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in September 2008, 
investors saw nonfinancial corporate debt as increasingly risky (Komine 2009). Unlike the 
commercial paper (CP) market in the United States, where most borrowers were banks, 
financial companies, or asset-backed CP (ABCP) sponsors, nearly two-thirds of issuers in the 
Japanese CP market were nonfinancial corporations. For that reason, the deterioration in 
Japan’s CP market hit these corporations particularly hard (BOJ Market Report 2008, p. 24). 
The Bank of Japan (BOJ), seeking to stabilize its commercial paper market and facilitate 
financing for nonfinancial corporations, cut interest rates in November 2008 and January 
2009, and implemented a variety of special market operations (BOJ Market Report 2008, p. 
24). First, the BOJ expanded the frequency and size of its operations to purchase commercial 
paper (CP) with repurchase agreements (BOJ Decision, December 2008). Next, on January 8, 
2009, the BOJ implemented special funds-supplying operations (the special operations) 
aimed to provide banks and other financial institutions with unlimited liquidity against 
eligible corporate debt pledged as collateral (BOJ Decision, December 2008).3 
In late January 2009, the BOJ also introduced a ¥3 trillion measure to conduct outright 
purchases of CP (Outright Purchases of CP 2009). To read more about the expansion of repo 
operations and other CP measures undertaken by the BOJ, please refer to Appendix A or 
Buchholtz 2018.  
Program Description 
The special operations had an objective “. . . of ensuring stability in financial markets as well 
as facilitating corporate financing by conducting appropriate money market operations,” 
using open market operations to provide unlimited loans against the value of corporate debt 
pledged as eligible collateral” (Special Operations 2009). Initially, the loan duration was 
between one and three months, the period determined by the BOJ (Special Operations 2009). 
The special operations allowed the BOJ to provide counterparties with loans at an unlimited 
amount, but equal in value to the eligible collateral pledged by the counterparty (Special 
Operations 2009). Eligible collateral under the special operations included corporate debt in 
the form of corporate bonds, most types of CP (excluding ABCP), bills drawn by companies, 
and loans on deeds to companies (Special Operations 2009).4 The loans, which were 
electronically transferred from the BOJ to the counterparty, came with an interest rate equal 
to the “average of the target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate,” which throughout 
the lifetime of the special operations was kept at 0.1% by the BOJ Policy Board (Special 
Operations 2009). 
 
3 The government also channeled support to the business sector through the Shoko Chukin Bank and the 
Development Bank of Japan, which was specifically authorized to purchase up to ¥2 trillion of CP. 
4 At the time, the Japanese financial system was in the process of transitioning from physical certificates to 
electronic transactions, a process described as “dematerialization.” Both physical and electronic transactions 
were allowed under the outright purchase program (JASDEC 2008). 
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The BOJ announced that the special operations became effective on January 8, 2009, with the 
first operation occurring the same day. The BOJ Policy Board amended a variety of terms 
under the special operations within the first few months of enactment. In January, the BOJ 
amended the terms to exclude commercial paper issued by real estate investment 
corporations from consideration as eligible collateral against the loans, at the same time 
announcing that it would begin to accept real estate investment corporation securities as 
collateral in the CP repo program (BOJ Amendment, January 2009).  
In February, the BOJ increased the frequency of loan auctions from twice a month to once 
per week and extended the term of each loan to three months (BOJ Amendment, February 
2009). The BOJ extended the duration of the special operations three times: once until 
September 30, again until December 31, and lastly until March 31, 2010. Also, the BOJ 
amended the special operations to extend all loans to three-month terms (Special Operations 
Modifications 2009).  
The BOJ conducted its final operation on March 24, 2010, bringing the aggregate amount of 
loans provided over the special operations’ lifetime to approximately ¥38 trillion (BOJ 
Market Operations 2009, BOJ Market Operations 2010).  
However, even though financial markets improved by this time, demand for the special 
operations remained high. Figure 1 shows the changes in loans provided at each auction on 
the left axis and the aggregate loan amount delivered on the right axis. While the amounts of 
all loans fluctuated auction-by-auction, as the graph shows, auction sizes would often 
noticeably increase at quarter ends. 
Figure 1: Special Funds-Supplying Operations (January 2009 – March 2010) 
 
Note: Data for December 29, 2009, auction is missing. 
Source: BOJ Market Operations 2009, BOJ Market Operations 2010 
In December 2009, the BOJ introduced a fixed-rate funds-supplying operation (FSO) to 
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Japanese stock markets (Shino 2011).5 The FSO was initially limited to providing an 
aggregate of ¥10 trillion in three-month loans against pooled collateral, by way of auction. 
When the special operations expired in March 2010, the BOJ expanded the FSO to continue 
to “encourage a decline in longer-term interest rates” by raising the outstanding loan amount 
to ¥20 trillion, increasing the frequency of operations to twice a week, and introducing six-
month loans, in addition to the three-month loans (Shino 2011). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The BOJ introduced special operations to ease capital constraints on financial 
institutions and improve access to funding for nonfinancial companies. 
Under the special operations’ terms and conditions, the purposes of the operation were to 
“facilitate corporate financing” by conducting money market operations and to ensure 
stability in financial markets (Special Operations 2009). Another aim was to put downward 
pressure on short-term lending rates in Japan (OECD 2009).  
During the BOJ’s Monetary Policy Meeting in November 2008, members of the Policy Board 
stated that strained financial markets and the deteriorating funding environment had played 
a significant role in decreased issuances and widening spreads on CP and corporate bonds 
since September (BOJ Minutes, November 2008). Because the funding environment for 
nonfinancial corporations was “less accommodative,” members suggested implementing a 
measure to provide liquidity to support them (BOJ Minutes, November 2008). Such 
measures, BOJ Board members said, should include altering the types of corporate debt 
eligible as collateral against BOJ loans and should expand existing funds-supplying 
operations collateralized by that debt.  
The special operations were launched under Article 33/37/38, Bank of Japan Act 1997.   
2. The BOJ could provide an unlimited amount of loans to selected counterparties. 
The only limitation on loans to a financial institutions was the total value of corporate debt 
a financial institution held that it could pledge as collateral (Special Operations 2009). 
3. The program could lend to financial institutions that were counterparties of the 
Bank of Japan.  
Eligible counterparties were already counterparties in the BOJ’s open market operations. 
They included banks and other financial institutions, financial instrument firms, securities 
finance companies, and tanshi (broker) companies. The financial institutions and banks 
that could be eligible as a counterparty under the special operations were those listed 
 
5 In November 2009, Dubai World, one of Dubai’s largest state-owned companies, announced that it would 
seek a six-month reprieve of about $4 billion in debt payments. The standstill was found to be linked directly 
to payments on a $4 billion Islamic bond issued by Dubai World’s property group, Nakheel. The 
announcement was met with significant drops across global stock markets. (Financial Times NA 11/25/2009) 
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under Article 37 of the Bank of Japan Act 1997, with some exclusions as defined in the 
terms and conditions (Special Operations 2009).6  
Also, the BOJ decided to add to the list of its counterparties the Development Bank of Japan, 
which had been privatized in October 2008 but retained access to government funds and a 
mandate to support the government crisis response, with a focus on funding large and 
medium-sized nonfinancial corporations. The Development Bank began outright purchases 
of CP in December, at the request of the government. The BOJ also added the bank to its list 
of open market counterparties and, specifically, to its CP repo program (Bank of Japan, 
January 27, 2008). 
4. The amount of a loan would be equal to the discounted value of eligible collateral 
pledged by counterparties.  
The prices of eligible collateral were calculated using the formula set forth by the BOJ, p. 
Different margins for each eligible collateral were dependent upon its residual maturity. 
Additionally, the margins could be adjusted when necessary to ensure consistency in the 
margin table as a whole in light of creditworthiness and marketability of the collateral 
(Guidelines on Eligible Collateral 2000). 
5. Collateral eligible to be submitted by counterparties included a range of corporate 
debt. 
Initially, the measure allowed the BOJ to purchase a range of corporate debt, which included 
different types of CP (Special Operations 2009).  
However, the BOJ excluded specifically accepting asset-backed commercial paper, and then, 
excluded CP issued by real estate investment corporations, at the same time announcing that 
it would begin to accept real estate investment corporation securities as collateral in the CP 
repo program (BOJ Amendment, January 2009).  
6. The loans were provided at a low fixed rate, equal to the average of the target 
uncollateralized overnight call rate. 
No details on motivation behind this design was found.  
7. Initially, the special operations would provide one- to three-month loans. Later, 
the BOJ amended the operations to provide only three-month loans. 
The BOJ would determine the duration of loans under the special operations for each 
counterparty, limiting loans to be between one and three months.   
8. Initially, auctions were to be conducted twice a month. The BOJ later increased the 
frequency to once a week. 
 
6 Financial institutions are defined in Article 37, Paragraph 1 of the Bank of Japan Act, Act No. 89, 1997. 
Eligible financial instrument firms, securities finance companies, and tanshi companies are defined in Article 
10, Paragraph 1, Clauses 2-4. Eligible instruments are defined in Article 28, Paragraph 1 of the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act, Act No. 25, 1948. The program excluded bridge banks. (Principle Terms and 
Conditions for Outright Purchases of CP 2009).   
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No details on motivation behind this design was found. 
9. Initially, the special operations were set to expire on March 31, 2009. The BOJ 
extended the expiration date of the special operations multiple times. 
No details on motivation behind this design was found. 
III. Evaluation 
According to an analysis by Hirose and Ohyama, the special operations significantly 
contributed to reducing CP issue rates during the first four months of operation (Hirose and 
Ohyama 2010). While CP rate spreads in Japan were increasing in late 2008, the coordination 
of implementing the outright purchase measure and special operations helped decrease CP 
rate spreads in January and February of 2009. However, the study finds that only the special 
operations, not the outright purchase measure or repo operations, contributed to decreased 
rates in March, April, and May (Hirose and Ohyama 2010).  
One cause of this may have been that the special operations were viewed as the least 
expensive of the three CP measures taken by the BOJ due to their low fixed rate—the BOJ 
maintained a 0.1% rate throughout the special operations’ lifetime. The low cost, in addition 
to an improving CP market in Japan, may have provided institutions the ability to submit 
better collateral against these loans. The BOJ believed that outside of extending the special 
operation’s lifetime, any other amendments to the operation might have had a negative 
impact on financial markets by increasing volatility (Mizuno 2009). According to one speech, 
it was the BOJ’s view that the special operations had greatly contributed to changing interest 
rates on CP. Moreover, if institutions chose to rely more on the special operations rather than 
other monetary measures, it would disrupt the market greatly and damage financing 
operations once the special operations expired (Mizuno 2009). 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
Principal Terms and Conditions for the Special Funds-Supplying Operations to Facilitate 
Corporate Financing (Bank of Japan — 12/19/2008) – Principal terms of the special funds-
supplying operations included providing selected counterparties unlimited loans in the form of 
auctions, but only up to the value of posted collateral. Loans initially had a duration of between 








Guidelines on Eligible Collateral (Bank of Japan) – The Bank of Japan Policy Board prescribes 
a set of guidelines that the Bank of Japan follows to conduct monetary and currency operations, 




Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on November 20 and 21, 2008 (Bank of Japan – 
12/25/2008) – The Bank of Japan Policy Board introduced the special funds-supplying 
operations as a response to strained credit markets that aimed to facilitate corporate financing. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BoJ_Minutes_11-20-21-
08.pdf. 
Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on December 18 and 19, 2008 (Bank of Japan – 
01/27/2008) – The Bank of Japan Policy Board introduced the principal terms and conditions 
of the special funds-supplying operations. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BoJ_Minutes_12-18-19-
08.pdf. 
Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on January 21 and January 22, 2009 (Bank of Japan 
– 02/24/2009) – The Bank of Japan Policy Board passed a vote to amend the eligible collateral 
under the special funds-supplying operations. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BoJ_Minutes_01-21-22-
09.pdf. 
Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on February 18 and February 19, 2009 (Bank of 
Japan – 03/24/2009) – The Bank of Japan Policy Board passed a vote to extend the special 
funds-supplying operations from March 31, 2009, until September 30, 2009. 
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Principal Terms and Conditions for the Special Funds-Supplying Operations to Facilitate 
Corporate Financing (Bank of Japan – 12/19/2008) – Principal terms of the special funds-
supplying operations included providing selected counterparties unlimited loans in the form of 
auctions, but only up to the value of posted collateral. Loans initially had a duration of between 








Article 37 of the Bank of Japan Act 1997 – Article 37 of the Bank of Japan Act 1997 states that 
the Bank may provide financial institutions uncollateralized loans and when the institutions 
“unexpectedly experience a temporary shortage of funds necessary for payment due to 




Statement on Monetary Policy (Bank of Japan – 11/21/2008) – The Bank of Japan announced 
that it would create a special funds-supplying operation to provide unlimited loans for liquidity 




Bank of Japan may reportedly double lending program (MarketWatch – 03/11/2010) – News 
story mentioning that the special operations lending facility will be expiring on March 31, 2010, 
while an expansion of the new fixed-rate funds-supplying operation is being considered by the 
Bank of Japan.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/MW_BoJ_03-11-10.pdf. 
BOJ meets as economy in worst slump since 1970s (MarketWatch – 02/16/2009) – News 
story discussing an upcoming BOJ Policy Board meeting where the BOJ wanted to seek 
“extraordinary” measures to assist credit-tight companies and alleviate financing conditions 
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Key Academic Papers 
Government, Business and Markets after the Lehman Shock: A Review of Aid to the Business 
Sector in Japan (Komine 2009) – This paper summarizes the effects of Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy and other economic events in the United States on Japan’s economy and 
marketplace. The author reflects on the increase in state intervention to maintain financial 
stability and the advantages or disadvantages that using state intervention has on the market.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Komine_2009.pdf. 
Reports/Assessments 
The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Japan and Abroad: Excerpts of a Speech at a Meeting with 
Business Leaders in Okayama (Bank of Japan – 08/2009) – In a speech, the Bank of Japan 
Governor said that the Bank decided to extend the outright purchases on commercial paper 
because although the commercial paper market has been recovering greatly, financial firms 
hoped the operation would still be in use to “facilitate corporate financing,” in case of any 
imminent debt downgrades or credit slides. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Mizuno_2009.pdf. 
Financial Markets Report – Developments in the First Half of 2009 (Bank of Japan – 
08/31/2009) – An analysis by the Bank of Japan found that CP operations have contributed to 




Identifying the Effect of the Bank of Japan’s Liquidity Facilities: The Case of Commercial 
Paper Operations during the Financial Turmoil (Bank of Japan – 10/2010) – This paper 
studies the effects of the Bank of Japan’s three commercial paper operations it implemented 
between October 2008 and May 2009. It found that outright purchases of commercial paper 




Because of the weakening commercial paper market throughout the global economy, Japan’s 
commercial paper market was hit heavily in late September 2008, following the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy. In response to the spreading financial crisis, the Bank of Japan’s Policy 
Board issued a number of operations to alleviate the commercial paper (CP) market.  
First, the BOJ expanded the conditions for the pre-existing repurchase operations for CP to 
facilitate short-term money market financing for financial institutions as a response to the 
credit crunch (CP Repo Operations). The BOJ increased the frequency of the operations from 
being conducted on a quarterly basis to twice a week, while also increasing the fund supply 
per operation from ¥300 billion to ¥600 billion (BOJ Markets Report, March 2009). 
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Moreover, the BOJ expanded eligible loan collateral to include dematerialized CP issued by 
real estate investment corporations and government-guaranteed dematerialized CP (BOJ 
Amendment, January 2009). 
In early November, the BOJ introduced special funds-supplying operations (the special 
operations) that would provide unlimited liquidity in exchange for an equal amount of 
commercial paper collateral from financial institutions (Special Operations 2009). The 
special operations provided a one- to three-month loan at a low fixed loan rate equal to the 
average uncollateralized overnight call rate. The value of the loan would be equal to the value 
of collateral posted by the participating counterparty. Collateral that was eligible to be 
posted against a loan included corporate bonds, dematerialized CP issued by domestic 
corporations, dematerialized CP issued by foreign corporates with guarantees, bills drawn 
by companies, commercial paper (excluding ABCP and, later, CP issued by real estate 
investment corporations), and loans on deeds to companies (Special Operations 2009). 
Finally, the BOJ passed a measure to conduct outright purchases of CP from financial 
institutions, aiming to transfer some of the risk from bank balance sheets onto the BOJ’s own 
sheet (Outright Purchases of CP 2009). The decrease in risky CP would help institutions 
avoid credit downgrades, thus allowing them to continue borrowing liquidity in the general 
credit market in order to meet financing needs. However, the amount of CP the BOJ could 
buy was limited to ¥3 trillion overall, limited to ¥300 billion per auction date, and limited to 
¥100 billion per issuer per auction (Outright Purchases of CP 2009). Moreover, the 
purchases included an interest rate equal to the overnight call rate plus a penalty rate, 
making the outright purchases of CP the most expensive of the three CP operations (Outright 
Purchases of CP 2009). 
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